The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity: Deal or No Deal?

Written on Wednesday, August 13th, 2008 at 5:27 am | by Ding G. Gagelonia

The Supreme Court convenes en banc this Friday under heavy pressure to say whether the MoA-AD carving out a ’separate sovereign’ in almost a fourth of the Philippines’ territory adheres to the Constitution.

The oral arguments on August the 15 will, of course, not yet be D-Day as the high tribunal, with Chief Justice Reynato Puno and his colleagues  facing their biggest test yet, may not yet issue a summary decision and deliberate a while.

But the pressure is strong given the continued fighting in North Cotabato, the MILF actions in Basilan, and the final admission from President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo that the MoA-AD is, after all, really the opening salvo of her outgoing regime’s bid to amend the Constitution and usher in a federal system of government.

This is raising the gaggles of most everyone, except true-blue GMA loyalists and propagandists.

Mrs. Arroyo’s critics are saying that the Cha-cha ‘dance’ is really not just about federalism which is Senator Nene Pimentel’s mantra.

The real agenda: to open up the charter so that a whole slew of amendments can come in, including the removal of nationality requirements in the exploitation of natural resources and, aha!, the removal of term limits for all those whose tenures are expiring in 2010.

On the BJE  itself, just what maneuverings have been taking place in the years leading up to this secrecy-obscured undertaking.

Are Philippine interests really the driver of the ‘advocacy’?

Think again and read on:

What is the US Institute for Peace (usip.org), the so-called Bangsamoro Development Agency, and a supposed $30-M grant offer for the peace process in Mindanao?

How has it come to pass that the Moro National Liberation Front is not party to the ‘BJE Deal’ while it is the sole Philippine group with full observer status in the Organization of Islamic Conference which recognition has been denied even to Manila?

This writer brings up these questions because a close examination of the USIP’s own web site reveals heretofore unknown maneuverings and ‘Mndanao peace process facilitation’ initiatives’ funded and shepderded by the semi-government federal think tank.

To its credit, the USIP has in its ranks apparently knowledgeable, and well-meaning Filipino scholars now based in New Uotk as senior research associates.

Also to its credit, the USIP has, in recent years, assidiously organized and coducted consultative forums with “non-government actors’ in the Mindanao peace process and worked hard at gaining a deep understanding of the ancestral domain issues and that various other factors that have hampered Mindanao peace and development.

But a particularly startling revelation is how Malaysia which has played a ‘mediator’s role in the secrecy-blanketed crafting of the MoA-AD is described in USIP documents as having “opposed” the USIP’s participation, along with a recitation of so-called “hurdles” in the ‘peace facilitation initiatives’

From the USIP web site:

  • “The Malaysian government had served as host and facilitator of the GRP-MILF peace talks since 2001 and opposed an American presence at the negotiating table. Moros suspected USIP’s presence, motives, and relationship with the U.S. government. USIP, lacking a permanent base in Mindanao, also faced challenges in establishing strong channels of communication with the GRP, MILF, and civil society. Multiple changes in the composition of the GRP negotiating team, and divergent perspectives and agendas within the Moro leadership and communities further complicated the peace facilitation effort. At times, senior GRP officials’ lukewarm support for an equitable and effective peace agreement hampered the efforts of skilled and committed negotiators. Corruption and criminality among the Moros, exacerbated by centuries-old clan loyalties, created other hurdles.”

It is also revealed that“USIP introduced concepts and approaches that were useful to both government and MILF peace panels. It helped inform the Philippine population, and elites in Manila in particular, of issues underlying the conflict in Mindanao, while presenting potentially viable means of resolving them. The Institute’s efforts have added marginally to more balanced media coverage.”

“USIP funding supported the publication of policy papers, which were distributed to scholars, analysts, journalists, and policymakers. USIP also sponsored educational materials for use in Philippine schools.”

The papers in the USIP web site show really focused efforts to help find a solution to the Mindanao conflict, and to be fair, the initiatives, on their face, project sincerity and commitment.

But the conclusions and recommendations in the summary report of the USIP project reveal more facets:

“Problems And Prospects

What are the prospects for a successful resolution of ancestral domain and the likelihood of an effective political settlement? Prospects are dim to good. On the “dim” side of the equation are the following questions:

(1) WILL THE CEASEFIRE HOLD? Recent violent incidents between MILF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Mamasapano and the Butilan Marsh have punctured the year and a half old ceasefire. Although the ceasefire is not dead, it has been weakened. Add to this the ongoing skirmishes in Sulu between Misuari’s followers and the Abu Sayyaf, on one hand, and the Philippine military, on the other, and you get a real sense of the volatility of the situation. If the ceasefire breaks down, progress and goodwill on negotiating ancestral domain may be seriously impaired.

(2) WILL A DRIVER BE FOUND? “Who is in charge of this vehicle called the peace process? And why is it crucial to have a driver? At the tactical level: Will there be a real, permanent, empowered team on the GRP side that could pull off the job, including selling the merits of a settlement on ancestral domain to the Philippine congress, the Mindanao power brokers, the corporations, and so on? At the strategic level: Who will marshal public support for a Moro ancestral domain? Who will start and sustain a badly needed effort at national reconciliation—the inclusion of the Moro narrative into Philippine national history and the overcoming of deep-seated anti-Moro prejudice? In the GRP peace panel, there is some interest in precedents elsewhere where the ruling regime has apologized to its oppressed minority—for example, in New Zealand. An apology to the Moros from Manila would probably vitiate Moro resentment to a significant extent, but it is too much to hope for from the government.

(3) WHO WILL SHOW US THE MONEY? Who will fund the implementation of an ancestral domain agreement? What resources will be used to compensate parties whose interests may be compromised by concessions to the Moros on territory and resources? Who will fund the sustained training of Moro administrative professionals and a Moro technocratic cadre that can effectively manage and develop Moro ancestral domain?”

Recommendations

Although USAID is extensively engaged in developmental protests in Muslim Mindanao, the U.S. has made clear that terrorism is its primary interest. This is understandable, but shortsighted. There are other helpful measures that the U.S. should consider.

“Support the ceasefire. The ceasefire has been the single greatest success of the peace process, but it remains fragile. Monitoring mechanisms on the ground need to be bolstered with training, funds, and other support. As long as the ceasefire holds, the parties can keep negotiating thorny issues, and it is better for them to keep talking, even if it takes years. The problem is when shooting begins. Helping to support the ceasefire would be a relatively inexpensive endeavor for the U.S., but it could go a very long way in generating good will towards us, and enhancing our credibility on peace in Muslim Mindanao. Such good will and credibility could eventually enhance our interest in combating terrorism. We need good intelligence to be effective and people will talk to us only when we have earned their trust.

Make available to the parties the best available practices and lessons from other countries that have resolved issues similar to ancestral domain with their own minorities. The GRP and MILF, for example, have both expressed interest in the experiences of Northern Ireland, New Zealand with the Maoris, Sudan, and other countries.

Make a generous offer of post-agreement development assistance, more than the $30 million offered previously. It would not hurt now for us to work with the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). It is a group run by competent individuals and they are focused on weeding out corruption early in the process of development training.”

So will is it deal or no deal for the BJE with some 20 months left in the term of this administration and whose interests are relly being ‘championed’ by the Cha-cha conductors and event managers?

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About The Author: Ding G. Gagelonia is a journalist of some 30 years, having worked in both radio and TV news and public affairs since his teens. Ding Gagelonia now writes independently and does corporate communications consulting. He has two kids, Felice and Luis. His journalist blog is at midfield.wordpress.com

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6 Responses to “The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity: Deal or No Deal?”

  1. DJB Rizalist on August 13th, 2008 3:00 pm

    (This plot gets much thicker over at The Nutbox, who promises to post something juicy here at FV)

    I’m beginning to think (always have actually) that the United States Institutes of Peace is a tumor growing on the brain of the US Congress, though my knowledge of them from years back is that Nene Pimentel was instrumental in uhmm introducing us to that bunch. The “senior research fellows” in USIP are likely his nominees. They’ve dominated the knowledge base of Kristie Kenney about peace in Mindanao and I fear that through them the US Govt was lulled into thinking that, in a deal involving Nene and GmA doing the chacha what could go wrong? In the run-up to the SONA, the MILF further discerned that chacha is her main agenda so they loaded it up to the hilt with their near-maximum demands, to the extent that the MOA begins with that famous intonation, “In the name of Allah, the merciful the beneficent.”

    As a reluctant consumer of USIP manifestos I often read them feeling like I found the root of all these crazy ass ideas about ancestral domains, indigenous peoples, federalism and how it will all expiate American guilt tripping over what they did to indians and indios a century ago. With the help of course of “senior research fellows” — the Jess Dureza peace nego types who’ve been leading people down the wrong path for years. In other words, this is all Nancy Pelosi’s doing! But even she could not have reckoned on GMA’s cunning. And that kristie kenney has always been putty in Malacanang’s hands. What I know is that she is a State Dept. pick, not the White House, and has been, ill advisedly in my opinion, been photographed in compromising positions with Al Hadj Murad.

    On a practical level, I believe ever more firmly now that DISARMAMENT by the MILF is a necessary precondition to any peace negotiations. Ceasefire is not enough. It’s the gaping hole in much of the thinking on these peace negotiations. The other thing is when will we stop tolerating Eid Kabbalu’s broadcast fairy tales and peace talk mumbo jumbo about all those lost-and-found commands of theirs?

    I enjoyed this post, Ding!

  2. cvj on August 13th, 2008 3:09 pm

    DJB, so you think that Ambassador Kenney belongs to some sort of ‘Lost Command’ running her operations along USIP lines instead of actually implementing the USA’s official foreign policy?

  3. DJB Rizalist on August 13th, 2008 6:22 pm

    cvj,
    No, yours would be too dramatic a statement about the nice US Ambassador. i just think she’s been naive, and/or the palace has been playing her like a violin. It was, and still is, quite disconcerting to learn that the lady was in Petrajaya effin malaysia ready to witness the signing of this entirely detestable MOA-AD, which is indeed a Trojan Horse for the Chachacheros.

  4. cvj on August 13th, 2008 9:01 pm

    DJB, i can understand why you are disconcerted. Cognitive dissonance tends to have that effect, but your interpretation would be a patronizing view of the Ambassador. What you rationalize as naivete (or ‘dhimmitude’), i see straightforward US Foreign Policy in action. Remember Occam’s razor?

    As i commented previously, if the US Government comes up with a message that ‘hails’ the MOA, then it will be clear that Ambassador Kenney has the blessings of her superiors and the Philippines has been sold out (again).

  5. Emily on August 23rd, 2008 8:03 am

    Do you think government’s decision of lending the ancestral land to MILF as bangsamoro juridical entity will bring long lasting peace to Mindanao?explain your answer.i just want to have your comment on this.Thanks a lot,I just badly need it.

  6. derio on August 30th, 2008 10:33 am

    It will definitely not. Only one thing will come out of this. Philippine dismembership. And giving a portion of the Philippines to terrorists. Remember that they bomb for a cause. Kill for a cause. Rob for a cause. Harbor and train terrorists for a cause. And now the Governemnt has the AUDACITY to even think of giving them legal and constitutional powers to govern. I really hope that Gloria’s term ends soon so that she and her generals can be jailed for having the gall to even present this to us.

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